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Abstract
This article examines the impact of trade liberalization on government revenues. Using
a new dataset on tax revenues for 130 countries between 1792 and 2006, we identify
ninety-nine episodes of trade liberalization defined as a large fall in trade tax revenues not
accompanied by a decrease in trade. Seven took place before World War One, seven in
the interwar period, eighteen in the Bretton Woods period and the remainder after 1970.
We examine the extent to which countries were able to recover the tax revenues lost by
liberalizing trade by using other sources of revenue. We find that historical (pre-1970)
trade liberalization episodes were unlikely to be accompanied by decreases in tax revenues,
especially during the Bretton Woods era. In the recent period however, over 40% of the
developing countries in our sample experience a fall in total tax revenues that lasts more
than ten years after an episode of trade liberalization. Overall, trade liberalization led to
larger and longer-lived declines in tax revenues in developing countries since 1970 than
in today’s rich countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. Results are similar when we
consider government expenditures, suggesting decreases in trade tax revenues negatively
affect governments’ capacity to provide public services in many developing countries.
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1 Introduction
How do trade liberalizations affect macroeconomic outcomes? Previous research has shown
that a long-run perspective on this question is useful for exploring how trade liberalizations
influence growth, employment, and living standards (O’Rourke, 2000; Jacks, 2006; Lampe
and Sharp, 2013); however, comparatively less is known about their impact on fiscal revenues
and hence on governments’ capacity to provide public services. Using a new panel dataset
on tax revenues and government expenditures covering 130 countries between 1792 and 2006,
we analyze whether countries in which trade tax revenues decrease experience a simultaneous
fall in total tax revenues – an effect we call “the fiscal cost of trade liberalization”. When
fiscal costs of trade liberalization are realized, we examine how long the decline in revenue
lasts. We compare the characteristics of trade liberalization episodes over different historical
periods, starting with the ‘first wave’ of trade liberalization (see O’Rourke and Williamson,
1999; Estevadeordal et al., 2003; Tena-Junguito et al., 2012) and up to the recent experiences
of today’s developing countries. For each of the 130 countries in our data we go as far back in
time as possible: our dataset starts in 1792 for one country (the United States), covers nine
countries in the 19th century, and thirty-five countries in the first half of the 20th century.
It is to the best of our knowledge the most exhaustive data on tax revenues available to
researchers.
We develop and implement a method to identify episodes of trade liberalization and mea-
sure the contemporary change in total tax revenues. The difficulties of constructing a measure
of trade liberalization that is consistent across countries in the recent period, or among a sub-
set of countries going back in time, are well known (see Lampe and Sharp, 2014, for a recent
review).1 The aim of our method is not to examine the fiscal impact of all changes in trade
policy, but to document the fiscal cost of trade liberalization when trade liberalization could
potentially have a fiscal cost – when it takes the form of a decrease in trade tax revenues.
We therefore choose to use a fiscal definition of trade liberalization which we define as a large
and prolonged fall in trade tax revenues over GDP. To avoid capturing decreases in trade tax
revenues that are not the consequence of trade policy, we restrict our analysis to episodes that
were not accompanied by a decrease in trade. Our method will not therefore capture trade
liberalization episodes during which countries lowered non-tariff barriers or decreased tariffs
set above the revenue-maximizing rate as these will not lead to decreases in tax revenues. By
definition it is better suited to study episodes when fiscal (or revenue) tariffs decline than
episodes when purely protectionist tariffs levied on goods with high trade elasticities are re-
duced (see Tena-Junguito, 2006, for the distinction between fiscal and protectionist tariffs).
We consider the evolution of trade policy measures (weighted and unweighted average tariffs
1Recent work has been able to construct relatively long time series on tariffs for a large set of countries,
but this is only feasible for a subset of commodities – see for example Tena-Junguito et al. (2012).
1
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
and trade agreements), whenever available, to confirm that our episodes are indeed related to
changes in trade policy. We then study whether countries are able to compensate for the fall
in trade tax revenues by an increase in other (domestic) tax revenues and argue that there is
a fiscal cost of trade liberalization when total tax revenues fall after the start of the episode.
We find ninety-nine episodes of trade liberalization thus defined. Seven occur between the
mid-19th century and 1914, another seven during the interwar period, eighteen during the
Bretton Woods period, and the remaining sixty-seven in the contemporary period (post-1970);
the sharp increase in the number of episodes over time in large part reflects the increase in the
size of our sample, as countries that used to belong to colonial empires obtain independence
and enter our data. Trade taxes fall by 3 GDP percentage points on average during these
episodes. 45% of the countries that experience a trade liberalization episode have not recovered
the lost tax revenues five years after the start of the episode and we never observe a fiscal
recovery in over 20% of the countries.
Comparing across historical periods, we find that the fiscal cost of trade liberalization
experienced by today’s rich countries at early levels of economic development is smaller and
shorter-lived than the one experienced by developing countries since 1970. Episodes in the
19th century and first half of the 20th century are characterized by a relatively smaller drop
in trade tax revenues and we always observe a fiscal recovery for those occurring during
the Bretton Woods period. There are also clear differences by level of development in the
period since 1970. The few rich countries that experience a trade liberalization episode never
experience any fiscal cost whilst over 50% of developing countries do. Moreover nearly a third
of developing countries are never observed recovering the lost trade tax revenues through other
tax instruments. Overall, episodes of trade liberalization are associated with larger decreases
in tax revenues in poorer countries, particularly so since the 1970s.
Our results are robust to the choices made in defining a trade liberalization episode. In
particular, we find very similar results when normalizing tax revenues by population instead
of GDP (to avoid capturing potential changes in GDP due to trade liberalization), when we
change our measure of trade and when we exclude episodes for which we observe an increase
in tax revenues prior to the onset of the episode (suggesting they may have chosen to preempt
the fall in trade taxes) and episodes for which there are no trade data available. Varying the
GDP thresholds or the trade variable used to define an episode similarly does not affect the
results.
Countries that do not recover the lost trade tax revenues through an increase in other
taxes may nevertheless maintain their level of public spending through an increase in non-tax
revenues. We look at the evolution of government expenditures during trade liberalization
episodes to test whether this is the case. Slightly fewer countries experience a fall in gov-
ernment expenditures than a fall in total tax revenues during trade liberalization episodes,
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suggesting that the decrease in trade tax revenues may indeed have been compensated for
by an increase in non-tax revenues in some countries.2 The overall patterns, however, are
strikingly similar. Nearly one-third of developing countries are never observed recovering the
lost government expenditures, and poorer countries are more likely to experience an expendi-
ture cost of trade liberalization than rich countries, particularly since the 1970s. Our research
does not attempt to assess the overall welfare impact of the trade liberalization episodes we
identify; it may be that the fiscal cost we document was more than offset by the non-fiscal
welfare gains from trade liberalization. This last set of results, however, confirms that in most
cases this fiscal cost did lead to less government spending on the ground.
This paper contributes to a large literature on the history of trade liberalization. In
particular a number of papers have investigated the relationship between tariffs and growth
(O’Rourke, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2001; Irwin, 2002; Schularick and Solomou, 2011;
Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2013; Lampe and Sharp, 2013), and more broadly questioned the
costs of protectionism (for a discussion see Krueger, 1997). We focus on a consequence of
trade liberalization – its impact on government revenues – that has attracted relatively little
attention in the literature. One exception is Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) who first identified
the existence of a trade-off between tax revenues and trade liberalization. They estimate
how domestic tax revenues react to changes in trade tax revenues in the short run using
post-1975 data and, like us, find an incomplete replacement of lost trade tax revenues in low-
income-countries. We build on and complement their work in several ways by taking a more
historical perspective. First, we consider the experience of trade liberalization in the history
of early developers during the 19th and early 20th centuries and elaborate on the differences
between today’s developing countries and the historical experience of early developers to
discuss potential explanations for the fiscal cost of trade liberalization. Second, our data allow
us to generalize their results for today’s developing countries to their complete fiscal history
since independence. Third, our method abstracts from short-term co-movements between
domestic tax and trade tax revenues possibly unrelated to structural changes in countries’ tax
structures.
In the last section of the paper we discuss possible explanations for why the fiscal cost of
trade liberalization differs across countries and periods by drawing on historical and contem-
porary examples of trade liberalization. In particular, we try to assess whether the difference
between the experience of today’s developing countries and that of early developers may be
explained by the fact that the former liberalized trade before they had developed sufficient
fiscal capacity to levy revenues through taxes on domestic production. This relates our work
to the political science literature on the relationship between fiscal capacity building and pro-
2These non-tax revenues could come from development aid, natural resources or borrowing; we cannot
document which of these revenues is the most relevant here as data on non-tax revenues are not available.
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tectionism. Queralt (2015) in particular develops a theory explaining how mercantilism can
pave the way for economies endogenously embracing free trade if mercantilist revenues are
invested in increasing fiscal capacity; Brambor and Lindvall (2014) argue that domestic fiscal
capacity is a necessary prerequisite for trade liberalization (see also Queralt, 2017).
Our results also speak more generally to the literature considering how state capacity, and
in particular tax levels and tax structures, changes as countries develop (see Johnson and
Koyama, 2017, for a recent review). Recent examples include the work by Besley and Persson
(2009, 2013) in which countries’ decisions to invest in fiscal capacity allows them to increase
their tax to GDP ratios over time and to decrease their dependence on trade taxes. Others
argue that as economies develop they undergo structural changes which make transactions
easier to monitor and allow governments to rely less on less efficient but easier to levy taxes
like taxes on trade (see e.g. Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Aizenman, 1987; Kleven et al., 2016).
These theories imply that countries will decrease trade taxes once they find themselves capable
of levying domestic taxes but they cannot rationalize the fiscal cost of trade liberalization.
We return to this literature when discussing possible explanations for our results. A smaller
literature discusses the conditions under which revenue-neutral reforms replacing taxes on
trade by domestic taxes such as the VAT will be optimal (Keen and Ligthart, 2001, 2005;
Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). Our results show that the typical trade liberalization reform in
developing countries since 1970 during which trade tax revenues declined was not revenue-
neutral but instead lead to a decrease in total revenues.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
We assemble historical and contemporary data on tax revenues in a coherent way that
allows for meaningful comparison across countries and over time. We primarily rely on three
data sources: Mitchell (2007)’s International Historical Statistics, the dataset constructed by
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) and the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance
Statistics (GFS). As explained in the data appendix, additional data on tax revenues may be
available for some countries and time periods not covered by our dataset. Please see the online
appendix for more details on the data sources, the methodology used to combine them, and
examples of other data sources available; in particular, Appendix Table ?? lists the countries
in our sample and the data sources used for every country and time period.3
Our aim is to detect and compare changes in total and trade tax revenues within countries
over time so we combine these three datasets in a way that does not allow for within country
‘jumps’ in the series which could be due to changes in data sources. We determine which
3The data constructed for this paper can be found in Cage´ and Gadenne (2018).
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dataset contains the largest number of observations for each country and use only data from
this source for each country, unless we see a clear continuity across sources. We do a linear
interpolation when a variable is missing for one country for less than three years. When the
gaps are longer (typically during wars), we drop the years for which the variable is missing
and create another country identifier when the series start again. Finally we exclude from
our sample countries for which we have data for less than seven consecutive years. Figure 1
shows the number of countries in our sample in each year (red line, right y-axis). Our data
start before 1925 for 13% of the countries in our sample, before 1950 for 27% and before 1980
for 75% of the countries; it ends after 2000 for 88% of the countries.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We complement our analysis of tax revenues by using data on the share of government
expenditures in GDP. Information on expenditures is available from Mitchell (2007) for most
of the observations for which there is also tax information from this source. The dataset
compiled by Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) however contains no information on expenditures
and the GFS dataset very little information. We therefore use the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook (WEO) database to complement our dataset.
Our main measure of trade is imports as a share of GDP as most trade tax revenues come
from tariffs levied on imports, but we also use total trade (sum of imports and exports of
goods and services as a share of GDP) as a robustness check. We use trade data from the
World Development Indicators for 1960 and from Mitchell (2007) for the pre-1960 period.
Comparing these two variables in the post-1960 period suggests they could be measuring
slightly different types of flows so we never combine the two sources when looking at the
evolution of trade during an episode.
We collect data on countries’ tariffs to complement our analysis of trade tax revenues.
We use data on average (unweighted) tariff on all products available from 1988 in the World
Development Indicators. This variable is a good proxy for the type of trade instrument
directly controlled by policy makers and helps us assess the extent to which our method
detects decreases in trade taxes that are really due to trade liberalization, as discussed below.
It is available for 34 countries in 1998 and 150 countries in 2006. We also use data on
‘average ad valorem equivalent tariff rate’ (hereafter AVEs), the weighted average tariff rate
(typically computed as the ratio of trade tax revenues to imports) from four sources: the
World Development Indicators for the post-1988 period, Lampe and Sharp (2013), Clemens
and Williamson (2004) and Schularick and Solomou (2011) for the earlier periods.
Finally, we use the GDP per capita data constructed by Maddison (2008) to classify
countries by level of development following the earliest available country classification from
5
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the World Bank (1987).4 The United States for example is a low-income-country (LIC) until
1856, a middle-income-country (MIC) until 1941 and a high-income-country (HIC) after that.
We sometimes classify countries with respect to their GDP in 2006, when we refer to ‘today’s
developing countries’, we include all countries that are a LIC or a MIC in 2006. Countries
are listed by their 2006 income group in the online Appendix Table ??.
Our main constraint in constructing our sample is the availability of data on total and
trade tax revenues. We exclude from our sample countries and time periods of potential
interest because of a lack of tax data comparable over time and across countries; we highlight
important omissions below to clarify which historical episodes of trade liberalization our data
will enable us to consider.
First, note that we do not have data on countries in Asia (except for Japan), Africa
and the Middle East prior to 1945. This is because many countries in these regions were
part of colonial empires at least until the end of World War Two, which gives rise to two
problems when attempting to look for episodes of trade liberalization. First, comprehensive
country-level tax revenue data are not available for most countries prior to independence; the
metropoles levied taxes in the colonies but often did not record systematically colony-level
tax revenues.5 Second, whilst some colonies were nominally free to set their trade policy in
practice most trade policy decisions were controlled, directly or indirectly, by the colonizers.
The metropoles typically set up preferential trading relationships within the empire through
trading agreements or empire-based custom and currency unions (see for example Mitchener
and Weidenmier, 2008; Estevadeordal et al., 2003; Jacks, 2014). In the 19th century moreover
the trade policy of some formally independent countries was also controlled indirectly, through
diplomatic and military means, by Western powers (see Bairoch, 1989, for a discussion of
‘enforced commercial liberalism’). Both these factors explain why we can only start looking
for trade liberalization episodes in Asia, Africa and the Middle East after 1945. Asian and
Middle Eastern countries typically enter our sample in the late 1940s and 1950s, African
countries in the mid to late 1970s.
Second, our data on Latin American countries start in the 20th century (starting with
Brazil in 1900). This is again due to the lack of comprehensive tax data in these countries
in the 19th century.6 The literature on Latin American trade policy in this period however
suggests that this data limitation probably does not lead us to overlook important trade
liberalization episodes: tariffs typically remained very high in Latin America in the second half
of the 19th century, in part because tariff revenues were needed to finance recurring regional
wars (see for example Coatsworth and Williamson, 2004). Most of the episodes of trade
4GDP is measured in 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars and is available for all countries for our period of interest.
5When consistent time-series on colonial tax revenues are available the unit of observation is often a group
of colonies within an empire, and allocating revenues (in particular trade tax revenues) to post-independence
country units is conceptually difficult (see for example Cogneau et al., 2016).
6Mitchell (2007) has no data on tax revenues by tax instrument prior to 1895 for this region.
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liberalization we find in the region occur during the late 20th century wave of globalization,
as we discuss below.
Finally, data on tax revenues and expenditures are particularly poor for countries from
the ex-Soviet bloc. Tax data for all but the very recent period are hard to come by for
these countries, and harder still to compare with other countries because the wide-ranging
intervention of the state in the economy until 1991 blurs the distinction between public and
private income. The statistical system used by countries during the Soviet era differed greatly
from statistical standards used in the rest of the world and convergence to global standards was
slow in the 1990s and early 2000s (World Bank, 1992).7 Our dataset therefore only contains
data on countries from the ex-Soviet bloc for which sufficiently long series are available from
either GFS or Baunsgaard and Keen (2010); this notably excludes Russia itself.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 shows the evolution of total and trade tax revenues as a share of GDP,
GDP per capita and tariff rates since the 1830s for countries that are HICs, MICs or LICs
in 2006.8 It highlights several stylized facts of interest regarding taxation and development.
First, we see that tax ratios increase with GDP per capita, in line with Wagner’s Law. This
is particularly evident in column 1 depicting the evolution of tax ratios for today’s HICs. In
the 1830s the two countries for which data are available (the UK and the US) are what we
would today call LICs and levy less than 7% of their GDP in taxes. Tax ratios then increase
in the second half of the 19th century to 9% as countries become MICs and keep increasing
by roughly 4-5 GDP points every twenty years until today. The trend of the first half of the
20th century, well-documented and often explained by higher demand for public spending
during wars (see for example Lindert, 2004), is maintained in the second half of the century.
These findings are robust to considering only countries for which data are available from the
1890s to the 1990s, as shown in Appendix Table ??. The cross-sectional comparison between
HICs, MICs and LICs in 2000-2006 also shows a positive, albeit weaker, correlation between
economic development and tax ratios. HICs are today on average 16 times richer than LICs
and levy twice as much taxes as a share of GDP.
Table 1 also illustrates a lesser-known stylized fact about taxation and development, the
‘tax transition’. Countries at an early stage of development rely on taxes on trade to levy
a large share of their revenues, as they develop this share becomes smaller.9 Trade taxes
7As a result, the two contemporary datasets we use do not report any data on countries in the ex-Soviet
bloc prior to the mid 1990s; Mitchell (2007) reports some historical tax data for Russia and the USSR but for
most periods does not report trade tax revenues separately and points to problems in comparing even total
tax revenues over time due to statistical inconsistencies.
8We only use the AVE measure of tariffs in Table 1 as the average unweighted tariff isn’t available for most
of the period under consideration.
9This stylized fact was first documented by Hinrichs (1966).
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represent nearly 50% of total taxes on average in the HICs we observe in the 1830s. This
share falls to 18% in the 1920s, 12% in the 1950s and decreases in the last 50 years to around
2% today. We observe a similar decrease in the share of trade taxes in total taxes in developing
countries, where trade taxes represent more than 25% (MICs) and nearly 40% (LICs) of total
taxes in the 1970s. This share decreases to less than 15% (22% for LICs) in the 2000s. The
correlation between the share of trade taxes in total tax revenues and development also holds
in the cross-section: in 2000-2006, the share of trade taxes in total tax revenues is ten times
bigger in LICs than in HICs. We see a similar pattern when looking at average tariff rates:
in 2000-2006, tariffs are more than six times higher in LICs than in HICs.
Of particular interest for the question asked in this paper we see that the tax transition
took a very different form in early developers compared to today’s developing countries. In
HICs the decrease in the share of trade taxes in total taxes is mostly due to an increase in
non-trade tax revenues: the share of trade taxes in GDP remains roughly constant over more
than a century (1860 to 1980) while the tax ratio strongly increases. The share of trade taxes
in GDP only clearly decreases from 1980 onwards, at which date trade taxes already represent
a negligible share of total revenues. In developing countries on the contrary the tax transition
is driven by a decrease in the share of trade taxes over GDP more than by an increase in tax
ratios.
[Table 1 about here.]
Changes in the number of countries in each group may lead to spurious changes in average
values over time. In panel B of Table 1 we focus on the recent period for which more data
for developing countries are available and see a similar pattern when we only consider the
87 countries for which we have data in each decade from 1970 to 2006. In contrast with the
steady increase in tax ratios over time seen in panel A we see that tax ratios have decreased in
both MICs and LICs during the 1980s and 1990s: they fall by 2 GDP points in LICs over the
period. The share of trade taxes in GDP falls by 25-50% in all country groups over the same
period. This fall is more than enough to explain the decrease in total tax ratios over time
in MICs and LICs but does not halt the increase in tax ratios in HICs.10 The last column
in panel B shows the evolution of the average unweighted tariff, available only for the last
two decades. We see this is highly correlated with the AVE measure of tariff; the average
unweighted tariff falls in all country groups but more so in developing countries, where the
10Part of the very large increase in tax ratios in HICs may be due to changes in the data sources used
over time. Our educated guess from comparing our data to official numbers released by countries’ statistical
institutes is that social security contributions are not included in the Mitchell (2007) data but they are in the
Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) data – see the online appendix for a discussion of this issue. Online appendix
Table ?? shows that the increase is smaller when we use only data from Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). This
particularity of the data cannot affect our definition of episodes, thanks to our rule for combining data from
different sources described above.
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average tariff in the 2000s is nearly half that in the 1990s.11
3 Defining trade liberalization episodes
We use a fiscal definition of trade liberalization: we define trade liberalization episodes
by a fall in trade tax revenues as a percentage of GDP of at least 1 GDP point from a local
maximum to the next local minimum that is accompanied by a non-decrease in the volume
of trade (imports) as a share of GDP.12
Our aim is to capture periods during which countries open up to trade through large
decreases in tariffs levied on imports (or less frequently exports). We follow the trade economic
history literature and use data on trade tax revenues to proxy for changes in tariffs (see
Lampe and Sharp, 2014, for a recent review). Formally, the variable we use to define trade
liberalization episodes is the following: for each country i and year t we measure
tit =
∑
j τjitmjit
Yit
(1)
where τjit is the tariff rate on imports mjit of commodity j and Yit is the country’s GDP.
13
There are three well-known types of shortcomings of using changes in revenue data to measure
changes in trade openness. First, this measure does not account for nontariff barriers –
prohibitions or restrictions like red-tape requirements that discourage trade. Removing non-
tariff barriers does not lead to a decrease in revenues – there is no potential fiscal cost – so
these are not of interest here. Second, it is biased downward because it cannot capture the
effect of extremely high tariffs in the average – at the limit a product with a 100% tariff will
not be traded and the removal of such a tariff could lead to an increase in trade tax revenues.
More generally, increases in tariffs set above their revenue-maximizing rates could lead to
decreases in tit as the fall in imports would more than compensate the increase in tax. Third,
scaling trade tax revenues by GDP implies that declines in trade volumes m, unrelated to
trade policy, could lead to decreases in ti. We address both of these concerns by looking at
the evolution of import volumes (also scaled by GDP) during falls in tit and define episodes
by a simultaneous fall in tit and a non-decrease in
∑
j mjit
Yit
. We use import volumes because
most trade tax revenues are levied on imports but consider episodes defined by a decrease in
trade tax revenues and a non-decrease in total trade (exports plus imports scaled by GDP)
as a robustness check.
11The correlation between AVE and unweighted tariff in our data is 0.69, significant at the 1% level. This
is in line with a large literature that has found a high correlation between AVEs and more policy consistent
measures of tariffs, see for example Irwin (2010) and Kee et al. (2008).
12We say that an observation is a local maximum (minimum) if it is higher (lower) than the preceding and
following observations.
13Some countries also levy tariffs on exports, in practice we measure tit =
∑
j τjitmjit+
∑
k zkitxkit
Yit
where zkit
is the tariff rate on exports xkit of commodity k.
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Ratios of tax revenues to GDP experience short-run fluctuations that may come from
exchange rate volatility, changes in the reporting period or business cycles and be unrelated
to change in tax policy. We isolate the trends in our data on total tax, trade tax and
expenditure as a share of GDP to avoid confounding episodes of trade liberalization with
short-run correlations. Our main method uses the Hodrick-Prescott filter; we follow Ravn
and Uhlig (2002) in using a 6.25 smoothing parameter.14 We define the size of an episode
by the difference between the local maximum value of trade tax revenues as a percentage of
GDP at the start of the episode (year s) and the following local minimum value of trade tax
revenues at the end of the episode (year e). The distance between year e and year s is the
length of the episode.
We measure the potential fiscal cost of trade liberalization by looking at the evolution
of total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. By definition, total tax revenues are expected
to fall during an episode unless countries are able to increase their tax collection from other
(domestic) sources of tax revenues by an amount large enough to compensate for the fall in
trade tax revenues. In the absence of such an increase, we say that countries experience a
fiscal cost of trade liberalization. More precisely, we measure for each episode of decrease in
trade tax revenues (i) whether total tax revenues as a share of GDP fall at the start of the
episode ; and (ii) if they do, the number of years before total tax revenues come back to their
level before the start of the episode. Formally, we define the revenue recovery year (r) as the
first year in which total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are at least equal to their value
in year s. We call the distance between year r and year s the (fiscal) recovery time.
Figure 2 illustrates graphically how we construct the episodes, the fiscal cost and the fiscal
recovery variables using the example of Chile in the 1975-2006 period. The vertical red lines
show the start of the episodes, the blue lines their end and the green lines the year of recovery.
The first episode starts in 1975 and corresponds to the first phase of Chile’s unilateral trade
liberalization reform during which the country eliminated all quantitative trade restrictions
and radically reduced all tariffs by replacing them with a uniform 10% tariff. We observe
rapid fiscal recovery for this episode, as early as 1978. This episode ends in 1980 at the
start of a severe economic crisis during which the government chose to raise tariffs to 35% to
correct external and fiscal imbalances. This return to protectionism was short lived and the
process of trade liberalization resumed in 1985 when tariffs were decreased again: we observe
a second episode that starts in 1985 and ends in 1993, an eight-year period during which the
uniform tariff was eventually reduced to 11% (see Dornbusch and Edwards, 1994; Edwards
and Lederman, 2002, for a discussion of Chile’s trade liberalization reforms). We observe no
fiscal recovery for this episode.
14This corresponds to a value of 1600 for quarterly data. Ravn and Uhlig (2002) show that the smoothing
parameter should be adjusted according to the fourth power of a change in the frequency of observations.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Our method only considers trade liberalization episodes characterized by decreases in trade
tax revenues. This is justified by our interest in the fiscal consequences of trade liberalization
– if trade tax revenues do not decrease during an episode there will by definition be no
fiscal cost – but leads us to ignore other forms of trade liberalization. We do not consider for
example liberalization reforms that remove quantitative constraints on trade, such as outright
prohibitions or strict licensing rules. We discuss an example of such reforms in Spain in the
1960s below.
Likewise, we do not classify as episodes decreases in truly prohibitive tariffs that lead
to an increase in trade and have a positive impact on trade tax revenues; this is a plausible
outcome mostly for decreases in tariffs levied on commodities for which domestically-produced
substitutes are widely available, which typically have high trade elasticities. We note however
that even during the highly protectionist late 19th century period in Latin America average
tariffs were always much lower than the revenue-maximizing rate: Coatsworth and Williamson
(2004) estimate a revenue-maximizing rate of roughly 50% and report average unweighted
tariffs always below 35%. Overall, whilst there clearly were over the course of history some
episodes of decreases in tariffs initially set above the revenue-maximizing rate (see Irwin,
1998, for an example), historical evidence on trade elasticities suggests average tariffs were
typically lower than the revenue-maximizing rate.15 It is therefore not unreasonable to think
that decreases in tariffs, more often than not, led to decreases in trade tax revenues. This
being said all our results in what follows should be interpreted as relevant regarding trade
liberalization that leads to a decrease in trade tax revenues, and not regarding all possible
forms of trade liberalization.
Two other types of changes unrelated to trade liberalization could lead to decreases in tit.
First, negative shocks to countries’ capacity to collect taxes could lead to decreases in trade
and non-trade tax revenues, this would lead us to confound a fiscal cost of trade liberalization
with increases in tax evasion. The administration of customs tax collection is, historically and
across countries today, often separated from general tax collection (Alink and van Kommer,
2016) so this scenario is fairly unlikely, but it remains a concern. Second, changes in the
structure but not level of trade volumes, away from heavily taxed imports, could lead to a
decrease in tit. We consider whether the episodes we identify are accompanied by changes in
trade policy instruments – decreases in average tariff rates (
∑
j τjit) – to assess the validity
of theses concerns for the sub-sample of episodes for which data on these instruments are
available.
Finally, note that our definition of fiscal ‘recovery’ assumes that tax-GDP ratios would
have remained constant in the absence of a trade liberalization episode. This may lead us to
15See Tena-Junguito (2006) for estimates of trade elasticities in the 19th century.
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over-estimate the extent to which countries are able to recover the lost tax revenues as the
literature (and our own evidence in Table 1) has found that tax-GDP ratios tend to increase
over time and as countries develop (see for example Lindert, 2004).
4 Trade liberalization episodes
We find 99 episodes of decreases in trade tax revenues and no decrease in trade, we list
episodes by country and date in Appendix Table ??. Figure 1 presents the distribution of
these episodes and the number of countries in our sample over time. We see a sharp increase
in the number of episodes over time which in large part reflects the increase in sample size:
two thirds of the episodes occur during the contemporary period (post 1970) for which we
have more data.
We find seven episodes between the mid-19th century and 1914, during the ‘first wave’ of
trade liberalization characterized by falling trade costs (Mohammed and Williamson, 2004;
Jacks et al., 2010) and the rise of the gold standard which facilitated trade (Estevadeordal
et al., 2003; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008; Mitchener et al., 2010). More surprisingly
perhaps we also find seven episodes during the interwar period, including four during the
Great Depression – we discuss these in detail below. Another eighteen episodes occur during
the ‘second wave’ of trade liberalization (1945-1969), an era characterized by multilateral
trade negotiations under the auspices of the GATT and the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchanges rates, as well as technological changes that further decreased trade costs (Hummels,
2007). Finally, most of the remaining episodes occur in developing countries during the most
recent wave of globalization since the late 1970s, this time in a context during which countries
gradually shifted from currency pegs (typically to the US dollar or French franc) to more
flexible exchange rate arrangements (Aziz and Caramazza, 1998). Many of these episodes
take place during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade negotiations, the first GATT
round during which developing countries committed to significant policy changes towards
trade liberalization (Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2013).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on our entire sample of episodes and Table 3 focuses
on the historical (pre-1970) period. The first column in Table 2 shows that the average loss in
tax revenues due to an episode is large: trade tax revenues fall on average by 2.9 GDP points
during the episode (column 1). This fall represents 58% of the average trade tax revenues
and 17% of total tax revenues at the start of the episode; the typical episode lasts 12 years.
This section first considers the episodes we find in the historical (pre-1970) period and then
turns to the comparison between historical and contemporary episodes.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
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4.1 Before World War 1
We observe seven episodes of trade liberalization prior to 1914: two in the United Kingdom
(1842 and 1851), one in Denmark in 1897, in Sweden in 1899, in Brazil in 1906, in Finland
in 1908 and in Norway in 1909. Column 2 in Table 3 shows that these episodes are relatively
small (never larger than 2.5 GDP points) and spread out over a relatively long time period.
The 1842 episode in the UK takes place immediately before the famous repeal of the Corn
Laws; we return to the circumstances in which this first episode occurred in section ??. The
1851 episode corresponds to the completion by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer William
Gladstone of the change in tariff reductions initiated by Prime Minister Robert Peel in 1842.
This episode was particularly long: we observe a continuous decline in trade tax revenues as
a share of GDP in the UK from 1851 to 1874, the year in which Gladstone’s Liberals where
replaced by the Conservatives. Trade tax revenues then remain stable around 1.6% of GDP
for the remainder of the 19th century.
The 1897 episode in Denmark is a priori surprising given Denmark’s reluctance to take part
in the post Cobden-Chevalier network of bilateral treaties in the second half of the nineteenth
century (Lampe and Sharp, 2011); this reluctance may however explain the slight increase in
trade tax revenues as a share of GDP we observe in the 1890s in Denmark, prior to a long
decrease starting in 1897 and continuing more or less uninterrupted until 1914.16
The absence of France from the list of early trade liberalization episodes may also seem
surprising. Settling the ‘Fortress France’ debate (see Nye, 1991; Irwin, 1993) is beyond the
scope of this paper, but three elements help explain why we see no episode in France in the
19th century.17 First, our data for France start in 1847 so we cannot consider potential earlier
episodes. Second, we do see a decline in trade tax revenues as a share of GDP from 1860
onwards (the year in which the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty was signed) but starting from a low
level of less than 1 GDP point: the share of trade tax revenues to GDP in 19th century France
was too low for us to detect an episode, in line with the discussion in Nye (1991). Third,
a major component of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty – the abolition of import prohibitions –
was an example of a trade liberalization policy that cannot lead to a decrease in trade tax
revenues and hence is not captured by our method. France indeed prohibited the importation
of a large number of product varieties before 1860 (see e.g. Tena-Junguito et al., 2012).
Germany is also absent from our list of pre-1914 liberalization episodes. Our data for
16This decrease in the share of trade tax revenues in GDP is mirrored by a decrease in the AVE variable
constructed by Clemens and Williamson (2004) which drops from 9.5 % at its 1897 peak to 7% in 1906 and
4.5% in 1913.
17While Nye (1991) argues that French average tariff levels were consistently below those of Britain through-
out most of the nineteenth century, contradicting the common view that Britain was the great nation of free
trade at the time, Irwin (1993) claims that the tariff revenue figures used by Nye (1991) may not be appropriate
to measure free trade policy. According to his interpretation of the commercial policies implemented at the
time by both countries, tariff protection was much higher in France than in Britain in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
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Germany begin in 1872, at the start of the German Empire which was then committed to
free trade. Following the general elections in 1877 and 1878, Germany was “at the forefront
of what would become a large-scale setback for globalization in the period before World War I”
(Lehmann, 2010), in particular with the adoption of the “iron and rye tariffs” in 1879 (Wolf,
2009). Hence what we observe in the data at the end of the 19th century for Germany is an
increase rather than a decrease in trade taxes over GDP, from 1,26% in 1878 to 2,6% in 1891.
4.2 The Interwar period and the Great Depression
We observe seven episodes during the interwar period, these episodes are substantially
smaller and shorter lived than the average (third column of Table 3). The first two occur
during the 1920s: Bulgaria in 1924 and Chile in 1927. The Chilean episode is particularly
interesting as an example of a country that liberalized trade after a major investment in tax
capacity: trade taxes were the main source of public revenues in Chile in the 19th century
and the early 1920s (Lederman, 2001) but the introduction of an income tax in 1924-1925
meant tariffs became less essential and could be decreased; we indeed observe immediate fiscal
recovery in Chile in 1927 (see next section).
We also observe four episodes of trade liberalization during the Great Depression (1929-
1938): in Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland in 1934, and in the Netherlands in 1936. To better
understand the mechanisms at play for these particular episodes, online Appendix Figure ??
plots the evolution of total and trade tax revenues as well as the AVE variable from Lampe
and Sharp (2013) over the period for these four countries. We see a clear increase in trade
tax revenues as a share of GDP and/or AVE in Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands
prior to the start of the episodes. These three countries were still part of the gold standard
until the mid 1930s and were therefore amongst those that initially resorted to increases in
tariffs the most to respond to the economic crisis, as highlighted in O’Rourke (2017) (see also
Eichengreen, 1992; Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). The start of the episodes coincide with the
dates at which these three countries abandoned the gold standard and hereafter relaxed their
protectionist policy.
The Irish episode similarly follows a period of very protectionist policy: Ireland increased
its tariffs substantially during the early 1930s Anglo-Irish Trade War (Whitaker, 1974). The
‘war’ lasted until 1938 but the tensions began to ease off from 1935 and the Coal-Cattle
Pact – around the time of the start of the episode. This first Irish episode is substantially
smaller than the two that occur in this country in the post World War II period and during
which the country definitely moved from protectionism to free trade.18 Overall, the trade
liberalization episodes we observe during the Great Depression are perhaps best understood
18The last Irish episode happens in 1967 and coincides with the 1966 start of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Area.
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as re-liberalization episodes that follow protectionist policies (see also Williamson, 2006), we
consider the robustness of our results to dropping these episodes from our sample below.
4.3 The Bretton Woods period
We observe eighteen episodes during the Bretton Woods period, defined here as 1945-
1969.19 One well-documented case of trade liberalization is absent from the list: Spain’s
gradual loosening, in the early 1960s, of the strict trade controls of the early years of the
Franco regime does not lead to a trade liberalization episode. This is a good example of
a trade liberalization case that did not come at the expense of trade tax revenues – and
therefore isn’t detected by our method – simply because the pre-liberalization policies were
characterized by non-tariff barriers to trade: strict currency controls and quasi-prohibition of
most imports. The trade liberalization reforms of the early 1960s if anything increased trade
tax revenues (which we find represent less than 2% of GDP for Spain even at the start of
the 20th century), in part because quantitative restrictions on foreign trade were replaced by
tariffs (see Prados de la Escosura et al., 2012; Lampe and Sharp, 2013).20
The average episode during this period, described in the last column of Table 3, looks
extremely similar to the average episode in the contemporary (post 1970) period, described
in column six of Table 2. The main difference with the contemporary period therefore lies in
the type of countries in which they occur: all of the episodes between 1945 and 1969 except
two – Indonesia in 1951 and Thailand in 1964 – occur in high-income-countries whereas only
two of the sixty-seven post-1970 episodes do. By 1970, trade tax revenues in high-income
countries represented a very small share of GDP, too small for us to detect more episodes
of trade liberalization (see Table 1). The post-1970 episodes thereby represent mostly the
experience of developing countries.
4.4 Trade liberalization episodes from 1970 onwards
In Table 2, we consider separately the pre- and post-1970 periods and countries that were
HICs, MICs and LICs at the start of the episode to investigate whether today’s developing
countries experienced a different fiscal cost of trade liberalization from today’s HICs when
they decreased trade tax revenues in the 19th and early 20th centuries.21 Our main focus
in this table is on the comparison between the trade liberalization experiences of today’s
developing countries and (i) that of rich countries since 1970, and (ii) that of rich countries
at earlier stages of development. We therefore present for each variable the p-value of the
19Through a misuse of language; the Bretton Woods agreement was effectively brought to an end in 1971.
20Lampe and Sharp (2013) also find that their AVE measure is not a good proxy for trade openness in the
case of Spain as it increases after the 1959 “Stabilization and Liberalization Plan”.
21The choice of the 1970 year to split our sample is driven by the fact that for the majority of developing
countries in our sample, data only become available a few years after independence.
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differences between developing countries (MICs and LICs) in the post-1970 period and on
the one hand (i) rich countries in the same period (column 10), and on the other hand (ii)
developing countries in the pre-1970 period (column 11).
We see that episodes are significantly deeper (bigger sizes spread out over shorter periods)
since 1970. Looking at differences by income group at the start of the episode we find that
poorer countries are much more likely to experience episodes since 1970: there are 0.2 episodes
per 100 observations among HICs, 2.3 among MICs and 3.1 among LICs. They also have
significantly lower total tax-to-GDP ratios and experience slightly deeper episodes though
the difference is not statistically significant. Figure 3 plots the distribution of episode sizes by
country income group (for all periods). We see that not only do poorer countries experience
bigger episodes on average, the entire distribution of episodes is shifted to the right for LICs
versus MICs, and MICs versus HICs.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Categorizing a decrease in total tax revenues after the start of an episode as a ‘fiscal
cost of trade liberalization’ is not appropriate if the decrease in trade tax revenues has been
pre-empted. Countries may decide to increase tax revenues from domestic sources before
lowering tariffs precisely to anticipate the coming fall in trade tax revenues. We consider the
evolution of domestic tax revenues in the years prior to the start of the episode to investigate
whether such pre-emptive measures occur: the penultimate line of Table 2 presents the share
of countries in which total tax revenues increase in the 3 years prior to the episode by at least
as much as the size of the episode. We see that on average few countries – 6.9% – preempt
the loss in trade tax revenues (column 1).22
Table 4 presents the number of episodes of decreases in trade tax revenues of more than
1 GDP point, the number of episodes obtained using our definition (decrease of more than 1
GDP and non-decrease in trade) and the evolution of average unweighted and weighted tariff
rates during the episodes, when data are available. We note that there are 30% more cases
of decreases in trade tax revenues of more than 1 GDP than episodes, defined by a decrease
in trade tax revenues of that magnitude and a non-decrease in trade. Online Appendix
Table ?? lists the episodes, their start dates and whether or not they were accompanied by
a fall in average weighted or unweighted tariff, we include in the list decreases in trade tax
revenues that are accompanied by a fall in trade.23 Overall we see that cases for which trade
tax revenues and trade decline simultaneously occur as expected in periods of contraction of
both GDP and trade – the majority take place in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s and
22Excluding these episodes from our sample does not change the overall picture in Table 2 (see Appendix
Table ??).
23To look at the 99 episodes included in our baseline sample, one must only consider the episodes for which
the variable in the first column on the Online Appendix Table ?? – ‘Fall in imports’ – is not equal to 1.
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1980s, the region’s ‘lost decade’ characterized by stagnating GDP and trade (Easterly, 2001),
some occur in Europe and Latin America during the trade contraction years of the Great
Depression.24
For the post-1988 period we check whether the episodes occurred during periods of changes
in the main trade policy variable available to governments. We find that, out of the 30 episodes
that occur in that period, 23 are accompanied by a decrease in tariffs, 5 occur in countries
for which data are not available and only 2 are accompanied by a small increase in tariffs.26
The average change in tariffs during an episode is -29%. The value of this exercise is limited
by the small number of episodes under consideration but we find this evidence reassuring: for
the post-1988 period at least it seems that most of our episodes are at least partially driven
by changes in policy variables.
[Table 4 about here.]
We use the observed change in average unweighted tariff to compute two measures of
the ‘potential size’ of the episode: the decrease in trade tax revenues we would have seen
if the decrease in the average tariff rate had been applied to all imports. This helps us
assess whether what we define as the size of the episode could be driven only by the observed
decrease in tariffs; a smaller ‘potential size’ than real size would suggest we are capturing
other trends, unrelated to trade liberalization, that lead to decreases in trade tax revenues.
Our first measure assumes the imports-GDP ratio remains the same throughout the episode
(this is equivalent to assuming that elasticities of both imports and GDP with respect to trade
are zero); this gives us a likely upper bound on the true potential size. Our second measure
uses the import elasticity estimates in Kee et al. (2008) to construct the change in imports
due to the decrease in the average tariff rate; we apply this elasticity to import-GDP ratios
so this likely gives us a lower bound on the true potential size (this assumes that imports
increase during the episodes but GDP remains constant).27 We see that even the lower bound
on the potential size is on average orders of magnitude larger than the effective decrease
in trade tax revenues observed during the episode (and larger for all episodes considered).
Finally, the third panel of Table 4 presents the evolution of average ad valorem equivalent
24We also report the liberalization dates used in Wacziarg and Welch (2008) to compare our episodes with
a measure of trade openness commonly used in the literature. These authors use a very different definition of
openness from ours25; we did not expect our dates to match precisely. We find that, out of the 47 episodes
for which Wacziarg and Welch (2008) also report a potential liberalization dates, our episode start date and
theirs are 5 years apart or less in 50% of cases. Overall, our trade liberalization episodes tend to occur before
the openness dates of Wacziarg & Welch (2008), in line with the differences between their definition and ours:
they categorize a country as open once it meets 5 criteria, only one of which is low tariff rates.
26These 2 episodes take place in Chad in 1999 and Mozambique in 1989, all our results below are unchanged
if we exclude these 2 episodes.
27Formally, writing mi the import-GDP ratio at the start of the episode in country i, ti the average tariff
rate at the start of the episode and ∆(ti) the decrease in the average tariff rate, our upper bound is defined as
∆(ti)mi and our lower bound as ∆(ti)mi(1 + mi
ti
1+ti
) where mi is the (average) import elasticity estimate in
Kee et al. (2008) for country i and ti the average tariff rate at the start of the episode.
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tariff rate (AVE). We find that there is a decline for 93% of the 84 episodes for which AVE
data are available. This confirms that our trade liberalization episodes are unlikely to be
driven by changes in trade volumes, which enter both the numerator and the denominator of
this variable.
5 The fiscal cost of trade liberalization
Table 5 presents our measure of the fiscal cost of trade liberalization across the three (pre-
1970) historical periods and Table 6 considers whether this cost differs between the historical
and contemporary periods and by level of development. We find several patterns of interest.
[Table 5 about here.]
First, roughly one-fourth of the countries are never observed going back to their pre-
episode level of tax revenues – we say that they experience no fiscal recovery (second line of
Table 6). This is significantly less likely in the historical period. In Table 5 we see that quick
fiscal recovery was extremely common for episodes during the Bretton Woods period (column
4) which coincides both with post-war trade liberalization and expansions of the welfare state.
All countries eventually recover during this period, nearly three-fourths experience no fiscal
cost at all. Earlier episodes in columns 2 and 3 were more likely to lead to a fiscal cost and
less likely to be seen to ever recover, though this lack of recovery amongst early episodes can
partially be explained by data constraints: we do not measure recovery when a data series for
a country is interrupted (because of no overlap between data sources, or a long period with
no data) before the tax ratio goes back to its pre-episode level, this happens for some of the
countries in which we observe episodes prior to 1945.28
Second, developing countries experience a fiscal cost more often than rich countries. The
first line of the table presents the share of countries for which we do not observe any fall
in total tax revenues at the start of an episode: in these countries trade tax revenues fall
but domestic sources of tax revenues immediately increase more than enough to compensate
this fall. This occurs for half of the episodes and more often in the pre-1970 period than
in the recent period. Developing countries are more than twice as likely as rich countries to
experience a fall in total tax revenues in the recent period. None of the HICs for which we
see an episode after 1970 also experience a fiscal cost of trade liberalization, while nearly 50%
of the MICs and 60% of the LICs do. There are also significant differences in the probability
of fiscal recovery by level of economic development. All the HICs experience a fiscal recovery
28Norway is a good example. We observe an episode starting in 1909, and no recovery, but this is because
our first data series for Norway ends in 1939. Our second data series for Norway starts in 1946, at which point
the tax ratio more than exceeds its level at the start of the 1909 episode, but our method does not classify this
as a recovery.
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but a third of the developing countries for which the episode starts after 1970 do not. In
the pre-1970 period some of the countries that were MICs or LICs at the time also do not
experience a fiscal recovery but they were a lot less likely to do so than developing countries
in the recent period.
Third, the countries for which we observe both a fiscal cost and a fiscal recovery return to
their pre-episode level of tax revenues slightly faster since 1970 than before 1970 (see ‘actual
recovery time’ in the third line of the Table). Rich countries that recover also typically
do so faster than developing countries in the post 1970 period, though the difference is not
statistically significant.
[Table 6 about here.]
The fact that countries that experience episodes since 1970 are less likely to recover fiscally
but recover faster when they do suggests that part of the differences across periods may be
due to data truncation. We observe countries for a smaller number of years in the post-
1970 than in the pre-1970 period and may not have long enough time series after the most
recent episodes to observe fiscal recoveries. Similarly, we could be observing less recovery
in developing countries because data series are typically shorter for these countries than for
HICs. We check that this is not what is driving our results by considering the number of
years for which we observe countries in the data after the start of the episode (see ‘potential
recovery time’, fourth line of the Table). This number is indeed higher in the pre- than in
the post-1970 period, but if anything poorer countries are observed for slightly longer after
the start of the episodes. Results are moreover similar when we consider the probability of
recovery amongst only countries which we observe for five, ten or twenty years after the start
of the episode (see the last three lines of the Table). Regardless of the time period used we
see developing countries recovering more in the pre- than in the post-1970 period (though
differences are not always statistically significant); developing countries are significantly less
likely to recover than HICs in the post-1970 period.
How large was the fall in total taxes during episodes? Figure 4 presents the distribution
of the fall in total tax revenues divided by the fall in trade tax revenues after 5 and 10 years
for the episodes without fiscal recovery after 5 or 10 years. On average the fall in total tax
revenues is smaller than the fall in trade taxes (the average ratio is 0.79 after 5 years, 0.82
after 10 years) but 30% of countries that have not recovered after 5 years experience a fall
in total tax revenues that is at least as big as the decrease in trade tax revenues during the
episode, that number is slightly larger (close to 40%) after 10 years.
[Figure 4 about here.]
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6 Effects on government expenditures
We do not attempt to discuss the potential net welfare gain or cost of trade liberalization
here. Our results suggest that trade liberalization has, in some cases, led to a decrease in
tax revenues, but this potential welfare loss may be more than offset by non-fiscal welfare
gains from trade liberalization. Moreover, a fall in tax revenues does not directly translate
into a welfare cost if it does not lead to a decrease in public spending. If it is compensated
for by an increase in other sources of revenues – development aid, revenues from natural
resources or borrowing, for example – the main potential reason to worry about the fiscal cost
of trade liberalization becomes moot. This is particularly meaningful in the post-1970 period
given the importance that the ‘aid for trade’ paradigm has taken during this period. This
paradigm advocates poverty alleviation via aid aimed at expanding export opportunities and
domestic complementarities to trade (see for example Balat et al., 2009). We therefore turn to
data on the share of government expenditures to GDP and consider whether (i) government
expenditures fall at the start of episodes and (ii) when they do, the number of years before
government expenditures come back to their pre-episode level.
Table 7 presents our results regarding government expenditures. The shares of countries
that experience a decrease in expenditures or are never observed to recover are slightly smaller
than in Table 6 for most income and period groups, particularly for LICs. This suggests that
non-tax sources of public revenues may sometimes have been used to compensate for the fall
in trade taxes; we cannot determine which sources due to the lack of comprehensive data on
non-tax revenues. The key patterns remain the same however: today’s developing countries
are more likely than both rich countries and developing countries in the pre-1970s period to
experience an expenditure cost and less likely to recover in five, ten or twenty years, though
the differences between country groups are less likely to be statistically significant. Trade
liberalization episodes lead to a fall in government expenditures that is permanent in our
data nearly 30% of the time in developing countries since 1970 whilst rich countries always
recover the lost government expenditures.
[Table 7 about here.]
7 Robustness checks
All the robustness check results in this sub-section can be found in the paper’s online ap-
pendix unless specified otherwise.We first show that our results are not driven by the episodes
that occurred during the Great Depression (see Section 4 above) in Appendix Tables ??, ??
and ??. The fiscal recovery characteristics of the average historical episode are extremely sim-
ilar when we exclude these four episodes, indicating that these episodes did not have different
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fiscal consequences from other pre-1970 episodes despite happening after periods of increases
in protectionism.
Our definition of trade liberalization episodes by a decrease in trade taxes and a non-
decrease in trade volumes, whilst allowing us to exclude decreases in trade tax revenues due
to the imposition of very high tariff rates or a decrease in trade, may lead us to exclude some
cases of genuine decreases in tariff revenues that happen to be contemporaneous to decreases
in trade volumes. One can imagine a situation in which a country decreases its tariffs but there
is a fall in trade, for example during a recession.29 We therefore reproduce Tables 2, 6 and 7
for the sample of 140 decreases in trade tax revenues of more than 1 GDP point in the online
appendix (Tables ??, ?? and ??) . We see that these episodes are slightly deeper than those
using our main definition and they are slightly more likely to lead to a fiscal or expenditure
cost, though the differences are small (36% of developing countries do not experience a fiscal
recovery compared to 32% using our main definition). We also consider results excluding the
few episodes for which there is no imports data (online Appendix Tables ??, ?? and ??), and
consider episodes defined by a non decrease in trade (exports + imports as a share of GDP)
instead of imports (online Appendix Tables ??, ?? and ??). Our main results are unaffected.
Results obtained using tax revenues (or expenditures) as a share of GDP may partially
capture changes in GDP growth. This is a potential cause for concern here as trade liberaliza-
tion may itself increase GDP (see e.g. Lee et al., 2004; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008).Estimating
the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is beyond the scope of this paper but
we consider whether growth increases following an episode by computing the average growth
rate before and after the start of episodes, using a number of different time spans. There is
no evidence that our sample of episodes were accompanied by increases in GDP growth rates
(online Appendix Table ??).
We consider an alternative definition of episodes using data on tax revenues per capita
to further address this concern: we abstract from using GDP data altogether and say there
is an episode when we observe a large fall in (smoothed) trade tax revenues per capita and
look for fiscal recovery of the total tax revenues per capita variable.30 The results are again
very similar to those obtained using tax data normalized by GDP. The difference between the
pre- and post-1970 periods is even stronger as all countries which experience an episode prior
to 1970 are observed making a fiscal recovery at some point in the sample period (see online
Appendix Tables ?? and ??).
The method we use to define episodes may not get rid of all noisy short-run variations
in tax revenues – in which case some of our episodes are spurious – or may get rid of too
29Our use of post-1988 tariff data suggests this was the case in some countries as we find that average
unweighted tariffs decrease during three of the four cases of simultaneous decreases in trade taxes and in trade
for which tariff data are available, see Appendix Table ?? for more details.
30We choose a 50% threshold to obtain a number of episodes that is similar to the one obtained using our
main definition.
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much variation, leading us to exclude informative episodes. We consider episodes defined
using a higher (2 GDP points) threshold for the fall in trade tax revenues and check for the
robustness of the results to the choice of filter by considering episodes obtained using different
smoothing parameters for the HP filter.31 A known concern with the HP filter is its ‘end-point
bias’ (Baxter and King, 1999) as the last point of the series has an exaggerated impact on
the trend. We use the Christiano-Fitzgerald band-pass filter to check that this bias is not
driving some of our results (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003). Results are presented in the
online Appendix Tables ?? to ?? and ?? to ??. We obtain more episodes (111) when using
the Christiano-Fitzgerald method and less episodes when using higher values of the HP filter
(90 and 94 episodes) or a higher threshold for the definition of the episodes (57 episodes), as
expected. The main patterns found using our baseline definition of episodes are unaffected,
and similarly unaffected if we only consider non pre-empted episodes – those for which we
know that the fall in trade tax revenues was not compensated for ‘ex-ante’ by an increase in
tax revenues (Table ??).
Our findings therefore indicate that developing countries i) are more likely to experience
a fiscal cost of trade liberalization, and ii) experience it for longer, than both rich countries
today and rich countries when they were at similar stages of economic development. This
suggests that the fall in tax ratios in these countries over the period 1970-2000 presented
in Table 1 can partly be explained by the contemporary decrease in trade tax revenues also
observed in the Table. Moreover, we show that the fall in tax revenues during trade liberal-
ization episodes in many developing countries is hardly compensated for by increases in other
types of government revenues: we observe similar patterns when we consider the evolution of
government expenditures after episodes. In the next section we elaborate on the difference
between today’s developing countries and the historical experience of rich countries to discuss
potential explanations for the fiscal cost of trade liberalization that we observe.
8 A historical perspective on the tax transition
Why are some countries able to recover the tax revenues lost from liberalizing trade
through domestic sources of taxation when others are not? To answer this question one must
first understand why trade taxes are such an important tax handle for countries at an early
stage of economic development - more than 30% of total tax revenues in early developers in
the 1830s and in LICs in the 1970s. The consensus in the literature is that while the Diamond-
Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem implies that taxes on international trade are
inferior to most forms of domestic taxation (for a review see Dixit, 1985), the former are easier
to levy or more ‘revenue-efficient’ to follow the terminology in Best et al. (2015). Optimal
31We consider values of 8.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002) and 10, as in Hassler et al. (1992) and Baxter and
King (1999).
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tax theory therefore predicts that countries will only tax trade if they cannot raise sufficient
revenues through taxes on domestic transactions. This may be the case in countries at pre- or
early industrializing stages of economic development if the characteristics of their economies
are such that governments have to spend more on enforcement and monitoring activities to
raise a given amount of revenues – we know for example that agricultural incomes are harder to
observe (and therefore tax) than incomes in the manufacturing sector and that small firms are
less likely to be tax compliant than large firms (Kleven et al., 2016). Relatedly, and following
the concepts developed in Besley and Persson (2009, 2013), we can think that developing
countries have less fiscal capacity and that less fiscal capacity is needed to levy trade taxes
than broader-based domestic taxes: to levy tariffs governments only need to observe a few
large transactions that are typically concentrated geographically.
These theories explain the tax transition observed in our data: as countries develop they
decrease their revenues from taxes on trade and increase taxation from other sources. They
are also consistent with historical evidence on rich countries which suggest that they gradually
lowered tariffs once they had developed a fiscal administration which made it possible to raise
tax revenues through other means (Ardant, 1971). A good example is the earliest episode in
our sample, in 1842 in the United Kingdom – a low-income-country at the time. In 1842, over
a third of the UK’s tax revenues came from export and import duties. Prime minister Robert
Peel implemented a large over-the-board decrease in tariffs, and financed the budget overhaul
by re-introducing the income tax and mobilizing the country’s modern tax bureaucracy built
during the Napoleonic Wars – in other words by utilizing pre-existing fiscal capacity. The
extra tax revenue raised was more than expected, allowing for further tariff reforms starting
in 1846, the famous repeal of the Corn Laws (Bairoch, 1989). We observe immediate revenue
recovery (no fiscal cost) for this episode.
9 Why is the fiscal cost of trade liberalization higher since
1970?
These theories cannot however explain why we often observe a fiscal cost of trade liberal-
ization in developing countries since 1970. On the contrary they predict that tax ratios will
increase when tariffs decrease: as countries shift their tax mix away from inefficient taxes on
trade (because of structural economic change or of increases in fiscal capacity) the marginal
cost of raising taxes falls, leading to an increase in (optimal) tax ratios. To explain the de-
crease in tax ratios that we observe one therefore has to assume that trade taxes decrease
for exogenous – non fiscal – causes, and ask whether these potential causes were more likely
to be relevant in developing countries since 1970 than in rich countries at earlier stages of
development, explaining the patterns we see in the data. We consider several such potential
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causes in turn.
A first potential explanation is that governments were pressured to liberalize trade, re-
gardless of the fiscal cost, by potential trading partners. Antra´s and Padro´ i Miquel (2011)
argue for example that powerful governments often succeed in changing the tariff policies
of their economically smaller trade partners. Such external pressures indeed influenced the
tariff policies of Asian and African economies in the 19th century: as explained above the
trade policies of colonies were often determined by the needs of metropoles (Mitchener and
Weidenmier, 2008), but external pressures to liberalize trade also played a key role in setting
the tariffs in formally independent countries such as China and Japan. These pressures did
not necessarily end with decolonization as newly-independent developing countries remained
heavily dependent on trade with their ex-colonizers in the first decades post independence
(see for example Head et al., 2010). This dependence made them particularly vulnerable to
pressure from their main trading partner, which in many cases was also their main source
of foreign aid. This hypothesis suggests the fiscal cost may have been particularly severe for
episodes that are accompanied by trade agreements. To test this we consider whether episodes
can be linked to countries entering trade agreements using information on the dates of entry
of the different countries in our sample in regional and international trade agreements from
the World Trade Organization’s Regional Trade Agreements Information System and histor-
ical sources. We are able to link 41 episodes to trade agreements (11 in the pre-1970 period,
30 in the later period); results presented in the online Appendix Table ?? show that these
episodes are indeed characterized by a slightly higher fiscal cost in both the contemporary
and historical periods, though the differences with our baseline sample of episodes are not
statistically significant.32
Another source of external pressure to liberalize trade may have come from international
organizations that often advocate trade openness. This seems consistent with the fact that
many of our episodes occur during the 1980s and 1990s, a period during which international
institutions often steered developing countries towards lowering tariffs through the conditions
on their loans (Rodrik, 1992; Edwards, 1997; International Monetary Fund, 2001). A good
example is the case of Argentina for which we find a trade liberalization episode starting in
1984 – the year in which the country, confronted with a mounting debt crisis, finally reached an
agreement on financial assistance with the IMF. We assess the plausibility of this hypothesis in
Table 8. Panel A compares countries that experienced a fiscal cost to those that experienced
no fiscal cost, Panel B restricts the sample to episodes for which there was a fiscal cost and
compares countries that recovered under 10 years and those that did not. We use data on
when countries received IMF loans from Barro and Lee (2005); these data are only available
32This is only an imperfect test of this hypothesis as the pressure from trading partners to liberalize trade
often occurs outside of formal trade agreements and fundamentally cannot be observed.
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from 1975.33 We find that in the recent period countries that experienced no fiscal cost and
countries that recovered under 10 years are slightly less likely to have been recipients of IMF
loans, in line with the idea that these countries were pushed to lower tariffs ‘too early’ by the
loans’ conditions, but the differences are not statistically significant.
An alternative explanation is that what we observe is the consequence of an optimal policy
change: governments in developing countries may have chosen to simultaneously open up to
trade and lower their tax ratios. Indeed, one argument sometimes made at the time many
developing countries entered structural stabilization plans was that governments intervened
‘too much’ in these countries’ economies, including through taxation (see for example Brune
et al., 2004). We find in Table 8 that developing countries that experienced a fiscal cost since
1970 had (marginally) significantly higher tax revenues at the start of the episode but were not
richer, unlike countries in which episodes occurred pre-1970, suggesting their revenues may
indeed have been thought of as ‘too high’ for their level of development. There is no evidence
however that countries with higher tax revenues are also less likely to recover, conditional on
experiencing a fiscal cost.
Finally, differences in the political economic determinants of trade liberalization across
historical periods could also explain the different levels of fiscal recovery. Governments set
trade policy partly in response to the pressures applied by special interest (see Grossman and
Helpman, 1994, for a formal version of this argument), once in place protectionist policies
create vested interests opposed to reform. Trade liberalization thus requires the emergence
of particular political coalitions; these coalitions could be different from the ones needed to
create political support for increasing domestic sources of taxation. One important political
determinant of the timing of trade liberalization in the 19th and early 20th century - democ-
ratization - has also been found to be relevant in the post 1970s period.34 There is substantial
evidence that democracies were more likely to enter trade agreements in the 19th century
(Lampe, 2011), though more so in labor-rich economies (O’Rourke and Taylor, 2006); simi-
larly democratic transitions often led to free-trade agreements in developing countries since
1970 (Milner and Kubota, 2005). Democratization is also a key determinant of growth of
governments revenues; Aidt et al. (2006) for example find evidence that democratization in
Europe led to higher government spending in the 1830-1938 period. This suggests that trade
liberalization episodes that were contemporary to democratization reforms could have led to
a lower fiscal cost than those that took place in more autocratic countries. We test this idea
in Table 8 in which we use the democracy index from the Polity IV dataset, available from
33We create an indicator equal to 1 if the country was the recipient of an IMF loan on the year the episode
started.We exclude the 2 HICs with an episode since 1970 from this Table as they do not experience a fiscal
cost and look very different from the rest of the sample on all dimensions.
34Because protectionism is typically more favorable to the capital-rich segments of the population, democ-
ratization, by shifting power away from these groups and towards the labor-rich working class, could in theory
lead to more trade openness.
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1800.35 The evidence does not contradict this hypothesis as countries that experience no fiscal
cost or recover faster are indeed more democratic in both the contemporary and historical
samples of episodes, but again the differences are typically not statistically significant.
Could differences in the types of democratic institutions in place in developing countries
today relative to those adopted by early developers explain the differences in fiscal cost? Most
trade liberalization episodes in 19th century Europe occurred in periods of limited franchise,
on the contrary in democratic developing countries universal franchise has been the norm
since the 1970s. It may be that in the 19th century limited government responsiveness to the
working class segments of the population made increasing domestic taxes, and in particular
non-progressive taxes on consumption (the main source of domestic tax revenues in early
developers and in developing countries today), politically easier.
The literature on the political determinants of trade liberalization in developing coun-
tries also points out that, unlike early developers, developing countries typically abandoned
protectionist regimes in periods of economic and often political crisis (see for example Ro-
drik, 1995). These crises enabled free-trade coalitions to emerge by relegating distribution
consequences behind economy-wide concerns, or ending on-going ‘wars of attrition’ between
competing interest groups (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Rodrik, 1994). The case of Mexico in
the run-up to the country joining GATT in 1986, well-documented in Tornell (1995) and in
Tornell and Hernandez (1997), is a good example. Up to the late 1970s, capitalist elites had
successfully blocked trade liberalization but the debt and oil crisis of the early 1980s left them
with a choice between wide-ranging liberalization reforms to attract revenues from abroad,
and expropriation – an option put forward by the competing statist elites. We find an episode
in Mexico starting in 1981, around the time the coalition in power agreed to start lowering
tariffs on manufactured goods. Similarly, in the case of Chile, the 1975 episode we discuss
above followed the major political upheavals of the early 1970s; Velasco (1994) argues that
amidst political turmoil business groups and trade unions were no longer able to oppose the
government’s reform policies which included trade liberalization measures. This particularity
of the developing country context could potentially explain the higher fiscal cost we observe if
these crisis coalitions lacked the legitimacy to simultaneously under-go the wide-ranging fiscal
reforms required to increase tax revenues.
[Table 8 about here.]
10 Conclusion
This paper shows that trade liberalization sometimes comes at a fiscal cost. Using a
new panel dataset of tax revenues covering 130 developed and developing countries from
35This index takes values going from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating more democratic institutions.
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1792 to 2006, we characterize 99 episodes of decrease in trade tax revenues and consider the
contemporary evolution of total tax revenues to investigate the potential fiscal cost of trade
liberalization. We show that in the period since 1970 developing countries are more likely
than rich countries to experience a fall in total tax revenues as they decrease trade taxes
and less likely to recover the lost tax revenues through other sources of taxation. They are
also more likely to experience a contemporaneous fall in total government expenditures. We
observe similar episodes of decreases in trade tax revenues in today’s rich countries when
they were at earlier level of development in the 19th and early 20th centuries but find that
they were less likely to experience a simultaneous decrease in total tax revenues than today’s
developing countries, and that when they did this decrease was smaller and shorter-lived.
Trade liberalization, defined here by a decrease in trade tax revenues, seems to have come at
a larger fiscal cost in today’s developing countries; this may be because they decreased taxes
on trade before having developed tax administrations capable of taxing domestic transactions
on a large scale. Our results imply that equilibrium trade models that consider the impact
of trade policy independently from tax policy may be over-estimating the welfare impact of
trade liberalization (see for example Alvarez and Lucas, 2007); taking into account the fiscal
consequences of trade policy in general equilibrium theories of trade is a potential fruitful
avenue for further research.
The fiscal cost of opening up to trade experienced by developing countries could be eroding
support for further trade liberalization. Trade taxes still represent nearly one-fourth of total
tax revenues in 2000-2006 in low-income countries. These are precisely the countries for which
the international community calls for increases in domestic revenue mobilization (Gupta and
Tareq, 2008; OECD, 2010). Our findings suggest that increasing these countries’ capacity
to tax could weaken one of the reasons they are reluctant to embrace free trade by making
governments less dependent on taxes on trade for public revenues.
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text for a description of the method used to define an episode. The red line, labelled on the right y-axis presents the
total number of countries that are included in our sample. The dashed lines indicate the limits of the different time
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Figure 3: Distribution of episode sizes
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Table 3: Episodes of decreases in trade tax revenues pre-1970
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1792-1969 Pre-WWI Interwar period Bretton-Woods period
Size of the episode (GDP points) 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.7
(1.4) (1.0) (0.5) (1.6)
Length of the episode (years) 14 15 8 16
(7) (7) (2) (7)
Total tax revenues (% GDP) 15.3 9.6 12.3 18.6
(6.6) (2.7) (6.0) (6.0)
Trade tax revenues (% GDP) 4.0 4.1 3.7 4.1
(1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.8)
Number of episodes 32 7 7 18
Number of countries 25 6 6 16
Number of observations 1862 525 443 894
Notes: Mean (standard error). The table presents descriptive statistics on our sample of 32 episodes of
decrease in trade tax revenues that occur prior to 1970. Column 1 presents results for the entire sample of
episodes. In columns 2 to 4 we present results considering only the pre-World War I period (1792-1914), the
interwar period (1915-1939), and the Bretton Woods period (1945-1969). See the text for a description of the
dataset and the method used to construct episodes.
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Table 5: The fiscal cost of trade liberalization pre 1970
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1792-1969 Pre-WWI Interwar period Bretton-Woods period
% Episodes with no fall in total tax revenues 62.5 42.9 57.1 72.2
(49.2) (53.5) (53.5) (46.1)
% Episodes with no fiscal recovery 9.4 28.6 14.3 0.0
(29.6) (48.8) (37.8) (0.0)
Actual recovery time (years) 5 7 4 5
(7) (9) (6) (7)
Potential recovery time (years) 41.9 60.3 38.7 36.1
(22.1) (33.5) (21.4) (12.5)
% Episodes with recovery under 5 years 64.5 42.9 66.7 72.2
(48.6) (53.5) (51.6) (46.1)
% Episodes with recovery under 10 years 71.0 42.9 83.3 77.8
(46.1) (53.5) (40.8) (42.8)
% Episodes with recovery under 20 years 88.9 66.7 100.0 93.8
(32.0) (51.6) (0.0) (25.0)
Number of episodes 32 7 7 18
Number of countries 25 6 6 16
Notes: Mean (standard error). he table presents descriptive statistics on fiscal recovery for the 32 episodes
of decrease in trade tax revenues that occur prior to 1970. Column 1 presents results for the entire sample of
episodes. In columns 2 to 4 we present results considering only the pre-World War I period (1792-1914), the
interwar period (1915-1939), and the Bretton Woods period (1945-1969). See the text for a description of the
dataset and the method used to construct episodes.
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es
9
9
3
2
4
2
1
7
6
7
2
2
8
3
7
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
8
5
2
5
4
1
8
7
6
3
2
2
7
3
4
N
o
te
s:
M
ea
n
(s
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
r)
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
d
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
o
n
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
re
co
v
er
y
fo
r
a
ll
ep
is
o
d
es
o
f
d
ec
re
a
se
s
in
tr
a
d
e
ta
x
re
v
en
u
es
.H
IC
s,
M
IC
s
a
n
d
L
IC
s
st
a
n
d
fo
r,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y,
H
ig
h
-I
n
co
m
e,
M
id
d
le
-I
n
co
m
e
a
n
d
L
o
w
-I
n
co
m
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
T
h
e
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s
p
re
se
n
t
tw
o
-s
id
ed
p
-v
a
lu
es
fo
r
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
(L
IC
s
a
n
d
M
IC
s)
in
1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
6
a
n
d
i)
H
IC
s
in
1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
6
(c
o
lu
m
n
1
0
)
ii
)
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
in
1
7
9
2
-1
9
6
9
(c
o
lu
m
n
1
1
).
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
in
o
u
r
d
a
ta
se
t
fo
r
th
e
p
er
io
d
a
n
d
co
u
n
tr
y
in
co
m
e
g
ro
u
p
u
n
d
er
co
n
si
d
er
a
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
la
st
th
re
e
li
n
es
re
st
ri
ct
th
e
sa
m
p
le
to
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
w
e
h
a
v
e
d
a
ta
fo
r
a
t
le
a
st
5
,1
0
o
r
2
0
y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
th
e
st
a
rt
o
f
th
e
ep
is
o
d
e.
C
o
lu
m
n
1
p
re
se
n
ts
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
en
ti
re
sa
m
p
le
o
f
ep
is
o
d
es
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
2
to
5
(r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
6
to
9
),
w
e
p
re
se
n
t
re
su
lt
s
co
n
si
d
er
in
g
o
n
ly
th
e
p
er
io
d
1
7
9
2
-1
9
6
9
(r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
6
).
H
IC
s
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
3
a
n
d
7
),
M
IC
s
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
4
a
n
d
8
)
a
n
d
L
IC
s
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
5
a
n
d
9
)
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
u
si
n
g
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
in
co
m
e
g
ro
u
p
a
t
th
e
st
a
rt
o
f
th
e
ep
is
o
d
e.
E
p
is
o
d
es
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
o
n
d
a
ta
sm
o
o
th
ed
u
si
n
g
a
H
P
fi
lt
er
w
it
h
a
sm
o
o
th
in
g
p
a
ra
m
et
er
o
f
6
.2
5
.
S
ee
th
e
te
x
t
fo
r
a
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
se
t
a
n
d
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
u
se
d
to
co
n
st
ru
ct
ep
is
o
d
es
.
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
T
ab
le
8:
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
o
f
ep
is
o
d
es
b
y
ex
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te
n
ce
of
fi
sc
al
co
st
an
d
re
ve
n
u
e
re
co
ve
ry
E
p
is
o
d
e
s
in
d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
si
n
c
e
1
9
7
0
E
p
is
o
d
e
s
p
re
1
9
7
0
A
.
A
ll
ep
is
od
es
,
by
ex
is
te
n
ce
o
f
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
F
is
ca
l
co
st
N
o
fi
sc
al
co
st
D
iff
.
p
-v
al
u
e
F
is
ca
l
co
st
N
o
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
D
iff
.
p
-v
a
lu
e
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
23
57
.3
5
25
28
.9
6
0.
37
40
68
.0
3
49
4
7
.0
5
0
.2
4
T
ot
al
ta
x
re
v
en
u
es
(%
G
D
P
)
18
.4
3
16
.3
0
0.
10
13
.8
2
16
.1
5
0
.1
7
T
ra
d
e
ta
x
re
v
en
u
es
(%
G
D
P
)
5.
87
5.
38
0.
34
3
.9
0
4
.0
6
0
.4
0
IM
F
p
ro
gr
am
0.
57
0
.5
6
0.
48
0
0
.
D
em
o
cr
ac
y
in
d
ex
-1
.3
4
0.
15
0.
1
9
3.
33
4
.7
9
0
.2
7
N
u
m
b
er
of
ep
is
o
d
es
35
30
65
12
2
0
3
2
B
.
E
p
is
od
es
w
it
h
a
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
a
n
d
1
0
ye
a
rs
o
f
d
a
ta
,
by
re
co
ve
ry
a
ft
er
1
0
ye
a
rs
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
o
re
co
ve
ry
R
ec
ov
er
y
D
iff
.
p
-v
al
u
e
N
o
re
co
v
er
y
R
ec
ov
er
y
D
iff
.
p
-v
a
lu
e
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
19
93
.1
5
13
50
.4
1
0.
20
30
48
.2
1
91
6
7
.1
4
0
.0
3
T
ot
al
ta
x
re
v
en
u
es
(%
G
D
P
)
18
.2
1
18
.8
1
0.
44
13
.8
9
13
.4
1
0
.4
6
T
ra
d
e
ta
x
re
v
en
u
es
(%
G
D
P
)
6.
50
5.
62
0.
35
4
.0
7
3
.0
6
0
.2
2
IM
F
p
ro
gr
am
0.
58
0
.5
0
0.
36
0
0
.
D
em
o
cr
ac
y
in
d
ex
-1
.2
6
1.
33
0.
2
0
2
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
N
u
m
b
er
of
ep
is
o
d
es
24
6
30
2
1
1
1
3
N
o
te
s:
E
a
ch
v
a
lu
e
in
co
lu
m
n
s
1
,
2
,4
a
n
d
5
is
a
m
ea
n
o
v
er
a
su
b
-s
a
m
p
le
o
f
ep
is
o
d
es
in
o
u
r
d
a
ta
,
co
lu
m
n
s
3
a
n
d
6
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
p
-v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
v
a
lu
es
in
co
lu
m
n
s
1
a
n
d
2
(f
o
r
co
lu
m
n
3
)
a
n
d
4
a
n
d
5
(f
o
r
co
lu
m
n
6
).
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
p
a
n
el
is
a
ll
ep
is
o
d
es
th
a
t
o
cc
u
r
in
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
si
n
ce
1
9
7
0
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
1
to
3
)
a
n
d
a
ll
ep
is
o
d
es
th
a
t
o
cc
u
r
p
re
1
9
7
0
(c
o
lu
m
n
s
4
to
6
)
,
co
lu
m
n
s
1
a
n
d
4
in
cl
u
d
e
a
ll
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
er
e
is
a
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
,
co
lu
m
n
s
2
a
n
d
5
a
ll
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
er
e
is
n
o
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
p
a
n
el
is
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
er
e
is
a
fi
sc
a
l
co
st
a
n
d
a
t
le
a
st
1
0
y
ea
rs
in
th
e
d
a
ta
a
ft
er
th
e
st
a
rt
o
f
th
e
ep
is
o
d
e.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
1
a
n
d
3
in
cl
u
d
e
a
ll
su
ch
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
er
e
is
n
o
fi
sc
a
l
re
co
v
er
y
a
ft
er
1
0
y
ea
rs
,
co
lu
m
n
s
2
a
n
d
4
a
ll
su
ch
ep
is
o
d
es
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
th
er
e
is
re
co
v
er
y
a
ft
er
1
0
y
ea
rs
.
S
ee
th
e
te
x
t
fo
r
a
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
u
se
d
.
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